China is continuing to ramp up its defence spending. So just how much of a threat is Chinese military power to America and the rest of the world? Simon Wilson reports.
What does China spend on defence?
A lot more than it used to, but nowhere near as much as America. Officially, China’s defence budget rose 12.7% year-on-year to ¥601.1bn this year ($90bn). Unofficially, spending on the People’s Liberation Army (which covers all China’s military capabilities, including naval) is more like $140bn, reckons the Pentagon. (The US budget is $530bn, excluding costs in Iraq and Afghanistan.) Some of that goes on nuclear weapons: China is set to double or triple its arsenal by 2030. Some goes on building a world-leading capacity for cyber-warfare; Beijing confirmed the existence of a “Blue Army” cyber unit in May. But most has gone on upgrading China’s air and naval capabilities.
Why the focus on air and sea?
Beijing is well aware that America’s rise to global dominance (like that of the British Empire) rested on sea power. Moreover, Beijing has a longstanding fear of encirclement by real and potential enemies, and a deepening anxiety about its dependence on foreigners for key natural resources. The Western Pacific (including the South China Sea) is a vital conduit for the sea-borne trade needed to sustain China’s future growth. Over the past year, the ways in which China has pursued its strategy – using threatening language; harassing ships; conducting large-scale military exercises on Hainan this month that, provocatively, included beach landings by troops – has alienated regional neighbours and set alarm bells ringing in Washington and Europe.
How has America responded?
One ground for optimism is that a peaceful west Pacific is a strong shared interest for China and America. America’s overall strategy is to engage with China (and build military communication channels that stop minor conflicts escalating), but also to hedge – by improving its relationship with India and maintaining key alliances in Asia. It is taking the cyber threat seriously. The Pentagon recently completed its first formal cyberwar strategy – and President Obama signed an executive order – formalising the doctrine that the US can treat cyber attacks as acts of war and respond by cyber or traditional means. “If you shut down our power grid, maybe we will put a missile down one of your smokestacks,” an official told The Wall Street Journal.
What are China’s military ambitions?
China frequently tries to defuse worries over its modernisation by reiterating (as defence minister General Liang Guanglie did this month in Singapore) that “China will never seek hegemony or military expansion”. The trouble with this mantra is that China also makes it clear that, when it comes to its “core interests”, nothing is ruled out, including war. The phrase “core interests” was traditionally used to refer to questions of territorial integrity, such as Tibet and Taiwan; last year Beijing used it for the first time to refer to its sovereignty claim over the whole of the South China Sea – much to the alarm of nations with rival claims, including Vietnam.
So what are China’s core interests?
General Liang defines them as “anything related to sovereignty, political stability and form of government”, especially any attempt to “secede any part of China from China”. It also means “anything that is related to the interests of China’s national development”. That’s a deliberately vague phrase, suggesting military action against a broad range of threats, including those affecting energy supplies, water and food, and trade routes. China’s great fear is encirclement. In that context, its “defensive” actions could conceivably extend far beyond its own borders (as did Bush and Blair’s “pre-emptive” and “defensive” attack on Iraq in 2003). The risk facing the world is that America and other powers will respond to the strategic challenge posed by China in a way that fuels a Cold War-style arms race.
Should we be worried?
No
1. China has good historic grounds for fearing an encirclement strategy. It is entitled to protect its interests.
2. Unlike Soviet Russia, China has no desire to export its ideology, and unlike the Great Powers of 19th-century Europe, it has no wish to amass colonies. Its economic rise masks a great demographic weakness: China will grow old before it grows rich.
3. America and China might increasingly become geopolitical rivals, but they have many common interests and are far too economically interdependent to get sucked into armed conflict.
Yes
1. US alliance-building is seen by China as military encirclement. China’s strategy of “offensive defence” is seen by America as expansionist. The result will be misunderstanding and conflict.
2. China’s motivation is impossible to calculate. The fact is, China is amassing a huge military capability; seldom in history has such a capability been built and not used.
3. Japan has already reoriented its defence strategy away from Russia and land forces and towards China – boosting sea and air forces focused on defending its southern islands and seas.